The politics of the document’s release are almost as telling as its content. The government published the 14-page public assessment in January 2026 - after it had been widely reported as due earlier - and only after a Freedom of Information action. The Times has reported that the published assessment reads like a cut-down version of a longer internal analysis it says it has seen. One that included warnings about climate refugees, increasingly polarised politics in the UK, NATO conflicts over collapsing food production in Russia and Ukraine, and escalating tensions between China, India and Pakistan that could potentially lead to nuclear war. Whether or not that claim is ultimately confirmed, the document’s uncharacteristic brevity is a signal in itself: the UK appears more focused on managing the optics of climate risk than treating it as an operational strategic priority.

Yet while its assessment is cause for concern, it still misses the key analysis one would expect from an intelligence report. Below is an attempt at filling this analytical gap, drawing on the literature cited in the report alongside well-established academic findings.

Share Theory_of_Change

The degradation of ecosystems is becoming tangible

At the heart of the assessment, the report identifies 6 critical ecosystems with a “realistic probability of collapse” starting for some as soon as 2030. The Boreal Forests in Russia and Canada, the Himalayas, the coral reefs in South-East Asia, the Amazon and the Congo Basin are all expected to soon reach a “tipping point”, beyond which major loss of biodiversity are deemed irreversible. A salient example given in the report is the Amazon shifting irremediably toward a drier savannah-type state starting 2050. These unpredictable shifts may take decades, if not centuries before reaching another stable state.

Source: UK Governement, “Global biodiversity loss, ecosystem collapse and national security” (2026).

The literature provided in the report explains why these 6 specific regions are key. The Amazon, Congo and Boreal forests are framed as globally significant “regulators”. Their degradation can amplify Earth-system feedbacks (including carbon-cycle disruption) and destabilise entire production systems. The Himalayas matter primarily through their scale of impact on water and food security for vast populations, with knock-on risks of conflict and migration in strategically sensitive areas. South-East Asian coral reefs and mangroves are highlighted for their direct links to coastal livelihoods, fisheries and coastal protection, meaning collapse can rapidly translate into displacement and instability in one of the world’s most trade-integrated regions.

The collapse of biodiversity threatens both scarcity and conflict

Across all six areas, the assessment treats their collapse as a “reasonable worst-case” trigger for cascading security risks. When critical ecosystems tip or degrade rapidly, they undermine Nature’s Contributions to People (food production, water regulation, disease control, coastal protection and livelihoods), can lock in damage through irrecoverable carbon release, and where ecosystems are already stressed, collapse can be fast and hard (if not, impossible) to reverse. Those ecological shocks then propagate through markets and societies into the three channels the assessment flags: food and supply-chain disruption, geopolitical instability including conflict and displacement, and secondary spillovers such as organised crime, disinformation and heightened pandemic risk.

• Food scarcity

This is where the report is most prolific. The assessment particularly stresses current vulnerabilities, including exposure to global markets (c. 40% of UK food is imported) and dependence on critical agricultural inputs, including animal feed (with South American soy a significant component) and fertilisers (with global phosphorus production concentrated in a small number of countries). If collapse happens, it notes the UK does not have the ability to absorb global shocks through higher domestic output. It lacks enough land to feed its population or rear livestock to maintain current consumption patterns and price levels. Land is not only insufficient but also vulnerable to biodiversity loss itself and climate impacts which can reduce yields through depleted soils, loss of pollinators, and drought/flood hazards.

Source: UK Governement, “Global biodiversity loss, ecosystem collapse and national security” (2026).

As food production decreases, scarcity is likely to drive hyper-inflation leading households to restrict their diet. Moving toward self-sufficiency would require very substantial price increases, a wholesale change in consumer habits and a dramatic transition of agricultural production processes.

• Domestic infrastruture collapse

Beyond food security, the report flags both rising displacement and intensifying pandemic risk as consequences of ecosystem collapse, but stops well short of tracing what either would mean for the UK. That analytical step is worth taking, since both would place mounting pressure on already strained domestic infrastructure. Years of austerity have made this risk already quite palpable: the UK's housing, healthcare and public services are operating under sustained stress, even before any significant displacement shock materialises. Ecosystem collapse would exacerbate this vulnerability, compressing timelines and narrowing the fiscal space available to respond. With anti-refugee sentiment rising, the political incentive to blame climate refugees rather than decades of underinvestment for infrastructure strain will be considerable.

The second channel, pandemic risk, is equally underanalysed in the report.. The COVID-19 pandemic offers a partia but instructive preview of the vulnerability of UK public health services to shocks. The outbreak overwhelmed health systems, fractured supply chains and required unprecedented fiscal intervention to prevent social collapse. The report acknowledges pandemic risk in passing but does not follow the implication through. What it leaves unsaid is that infrastructure is not a passive backdrop to these cascades, it is both a transmission mechanism and a threshold. When it holds, shocks are absorbed. When it fails, they amplify. And it is at the point of infrastructure failure that resource stress stops being an economic problem and becomes a political one, which is where the next section turns.

UK healthcare waiting list stands at a record high of 7.8 million patients

Source: NHS England via IFS (2024)

Resource scarcity breeds political disruption

This is not speculative. The report itself mentions “political polarisation”as a potential risk. Interestingly though for a security document, the mention sits in one unique bullet point without any specific analytical anchor. Yet the academic groundwork is hardly lacking. The analytical link between ecological stress and political disruption increase dates back to Homer-Dixon (1994, 1999). His foundational framework highlights that scarcity can sharply increase demands on key institutions, such as the state, while simultaneously reducing their capacity to meet those demands. Compounded with social, political and economic factors, environmental scarcity deepens poverty, inequality and large-scale migrations, sharpening social cleavages and civil unrest. These pressures in turn increase the chance that the state will either fragment or become more authoritarian.

The UK cost-of-living crisis of 2021–2024 offers an instructive, if partial, test case. It was triggered by a cascade of resource shocks, from post-pandemic supply chain disruption, to the energy price spike following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and sustained food price inflation that reached 19.2% in 2023, the highest in the G7. The consequences were dire. In 2023, UNICEF data showed that child poverty in the UK had risen faster than in any other country in Europe and possibly faster than in any comparable country measured worldwide. This economic hardship - driven by food, energy and housing costs - translated directly into declining support for the government, following a recognisably Homerian logic unfolding with unusual speed. The unequal distribution of the crisis's costs, with the poorest households experiencing inflation rates substantially higher than the wealthiest, accelerated a political drift that had been observable over several decades, providing the conditions in which Reform UK's insurgent far-right politics found fertile ground.

While this crisis was absorbed without institutional collapse, this relative resilience rests precisely on the continued functioning of global supply chains, stable food import markets, and the fiscal capacity to subsidise household energy costs. If a temporary resource shock produced measurable political radicalisation in one of the world's most institutionally stable democracies, then what the report is describing - shocks that are not temporary, not bufferable, and not reversible - will most likely generate far greater instability and political unrest. The disturbing implication is that Homer-Dixon’s framework may describe not where the UK currently stands, but where it is headed.

To understand where that drift leads, the fragile state literature is instructive. In states where government authority has weakened, individuals increasingly rely on non-state actors, such as militias, religious leaders, and criminal networks, to meet needs the state can no longer provide. The key mechanism, well-established in the literature, is that of substitution: when the state can no longer deliver food security, physical security or basic services, alternative power structures fill the void, and radical organisations exploit that vacuum to build legitimacy and territorial control. The report points at this dynamic, referencing the rise of "mercenaries and pseudo-governments" and the exploitation of scarce resources by serious and organised crime, but frames it as a risk confined to already-fragile regions of the global south.

What the Homer-Dixon framework implies, and what the UK's own cost-of-living experience begins to illustrate, is that this substitution dynamic is not exclusive to weak states; it operates on a spectrum. A wealthy democracy does not skip from stability to militia control overnight. But it can drift from institutional trust to institutional cynicism, from mainstream politics to insurgent populism, from social cohesion to sharpened cleavage. Ecosystem collapse, by eroding the material foundations on which that trust rests, would accelerate that drift in ways that no government intervention can easily buffer. The question the report does not ask, but implies, is at what point a temporary drift becomes a structural rupture.

Competition for scarce resources renders geopolitical escalation inevitable

The fourth and most extreme cascade the report identifies is geopolitical escalation in the form of inter-state competition over scarce resources intensifying into military conflict, with the UK potentially drawn into confrontations it did not initiate and cannot easily exit. The India-Pakistan water dispute offers a real-time illustration of this cascade mapping from Himalayan ecosystem stress to military confrontation between nuclear-armed States. The Himalayas play a vital role as a water tower for vast populations across South Asia, with knock-on risks of conflict and migration in strategically sensitive areas. While the published version of the report stops there, the Times reported that the longer internal assessment went considerably further: declining Himalayan river flows, driven by accelerating glacier retreat, would "almost certainly escalate tensions" between China, India and Pakistan potentially leading to nuclear conflict. That finding was reportedly removed before publication, the government probably deeming it too alarming to release.

However, the events of the past year suggest it was not alarming enough. Following a terrorist attack in Kashmir in April 2025, India launched military strikes on Pakistan, the largest aerial engagement between the two countries in decades, and unilaterally suspended the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, the agreement that had governed shared Himalyan river resources through four previous wars. On the World Water Day event on 19 March 2026, Pakistan climate minister warned that 25 to 30 percent of Pakistan's GDP and nearly half its workforce depend entirely on agriculture linked to water availability, and that the politicisation of water was not just a legal issue but a humanitarian one. With the Himalayan glaciers retreating at accelerating rates, the tensions around the Himalayan rivers would almost certainly escalate further between the two nuclear-armed States.

The UK will most likely be dragged into such conflict. Pakistan and India together produce a significant share of global wheat, rice and cotton. A water crisis like the Indus Waters dispute, severe enough to devastate Pakistani agriculture, would significantly reduce global food supply and drive up prices. Instability in the region would also disrupt the agricultural fertilizers supply chains that feed into global commodity prices. Finally, and this is the most speculative but most dramatic connection, the UK is a NATO member and a close US ally with significant strategic interests in South Asian stability. A conflict that escalates toward nuclear use would trigger Article 5 considerations and draw in Western allies whether they chose it or not. The original report apparently made this connection explicitly, a shame that it was redacted.

The political response remains nowhere near commensurate with the threat

The document explicitly frames itself as an intelligence-style “reasonable worst-case” assessment, built to inform planning under uncertainty. So the question isn’t just what the assessemnt says, but what kind of statecraft it implies: if nature loss is a national security risk, what does preparedness even look like and why does the UK still treat nature policy as optional? On this question the report is completely silent, a silence that is itself revealing. This pattern is not unique to the UK. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has documented how Western governments systematically deny, delay and downplay climate intelligence, releasing assessments late, in abridged form, without fanfare, and stripped of their most consequential conclusions. The result is a structural gap between what governments know and what they act on, and between what they act on and what the public is permitted to understand.

This gap is not abstract. It has a cost measured in years of foregone preparation. The cascades the report describes - food system shock, infrastructure pressure, political radicalisation, geopolitical escalation - do not wait for governments to feel ready to discuss them; they are already unfolding in the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, in NHS waiting rooms, in food bank queues, and in the polling data for insurgent parties. The report's own intelligence framework assigns "high confidence" to the finding that every critical ecosystem is on a pathway to collapse. It assigns the same confidence to the finding that threats will increase with degradation and intensify with collapse. What it does not say - and no government appears willing to say - is that the window for preparation is not infinite, and that managing the optics of ecological risk is not the same as managing the risk itself.

Conclusion

The report, even in its redacted form, represents something genuinely significant: the first time the UK's intelligence establishment has formally classified ecological breakdown as a first-order national security threat. That alone should have generated serious public debate and urgent policy response. Instead it was buried, abridged, and published without a press release. The scale of what the document describes is not a communications failure, it is a governance failure. One that reflects a structural incapacity of the State to respond to threats that are slow-moving, deeply interconnected, and resistant to the kind of visible, attributable crisis that political systems are designed to manage.

Ecological collapse does not arrive like a missile. It arrives like a tide: gradually, then all at once. The cascades that I have traced from food system fragility to infrastructure stress, from political radicalisation to nuclear flashpoints, are not predictions about a distant future. They are descriptions of globalised processes already underway. What the report implies, and what its own suppression confirms, is that the UK government understands the severity of what is coming. The question that remains and that I cannot answer is whether understanding is enough, or whether it is simply the first stage of a longer and more comfortable denial.

In 1972, a team working with MIT built a simple world model for The Limits to Growth and warned that “business as usual” could lead to overshoot, followed by long declines in welfare indicators within the 21st century. Half a century later, Herrington’s update comparing the model’s scenarios to real-world data suggest we’ve tracked uncomfortably close to those overshoot pathways. Meanwhile, the IPCC’s latest synthesis is blunt: without stronger policies, we’re headed for 3.2°C of warming by 2100, a risk multiplier for food systems, livelihoods, and displacement.

But collapse, if it comes, won’t look like a single Hollywood “Don’t Look Up” type of event. It’ll be slower, messier, and more cruel: repeated shocks that grind down household buffers, force distress sales, and unravel the social ties that make survival possible. Showing up as destitution, chronic poverty, and dislocation, one lean season, one failed harvest, one price spike at a time. The Sahel is already living pieces of that future. This literature review tries to make sense of one of the most brutal channels linking climate stress to long-run suffering: how households cope under overlapping crises, and how “survival” strategies can become pathways into chronic poverty.

-------

Over recent years, households in the Global South have faced a succession of crisis with severe consequences for their livelihoods (Brunelin et al., 2025[1]). Pandemics, climate hazards, violent conflicts, and inflation spikes have not occurred in isolation but have compounded, occurring either simultaneously or sequentially within short periods of time. This pattern of overlapping crises is straining households’ ability to meet the most basic needs (WB, 2025[2]), and is likely to persist (IPCC AR6, 2023[3]). It is therefore crucial to understand how to respond effectively.

Many of the most consequential responses to shocks are organised within the household, and shaped by the ability to access insurance mechanisms. In fragile contexts specifically, formal insurance against shocks being weak, informal community-based safety nets often take over (Dercon, 2002[4]). In multi-shock environments however, when entire communities are affected repeatedly, these informal safety nets eventually shut down. Households end up reacting in unsustainable ways, such as selling cattle or land.

These negative coping strategies may indeed alleviate part of the immediate burden on families but can also undermine their future coping capacity. For example, distressed sale of agricultural land may finance immediate food needs but erodes future production, credit access, and social standing. In 2023, it was estimated that a quarter of all households in the Sahel were forced to use at least one of these harmful strategies to buy food (Brunelin et al., 2025[5]). This highlights the difficult trade-off which takes place in fragile environments, between short-term survival and long-term resilience (Carter and Barrett, 2006; Baez et al., 2015).

Rural households are particularly at risk here. They are disproportionately exposed to climate hazards and conflicts compared to wealthier households (Brunelin et al., 2025[6]), and have a more limited access to formal insurance mechanisms to weather these shocks. Floods and droughts can destroy agricultural land, cattle and overall productive assets (FAO, 2023[7]) and prompt the distressed sale of the remaining ones. When crises compound overtime, reconstituting lost assets becomes virtually impossible (Barrett et al. 2003), fuelling internal migration, dislocating communities and the very social networks poor households rely on to survive.

Rurality is not the sole driver of reliance on erosive coping and chronic deprivation in multi-shock settings. Gender, age and disability are also key (IPCC, 2023[8]). In the Sahel, women for instance are the first to reduce their own consumption to safeguard children’s diets during lean seasons (Beaman and Dillon, 2012; WFP, 2023). Women also hold a larger share of wealth in portable liquid assets, which are often drawn down first during crises, potentially widening gender asset gaps and weakening long-run resilience (Erman et al., 2021[9]). These patterns along with differences by social status and ethnicity motivate an intersectional approach to analysing shocks, coping, and poverty dynamics.

Although a substantial literature already examines household coping strategies and long-term resilience, much of the empirical evidence is based on the study of isolated shocks. When shocks compound, however, coping responses may differ. While policy frameworks increasingly acknowledge these dynamics, in practice responses still rely heavily on discrete, ex post interventions rather than scalable systems that can be activated repeatedly. Bridging this gap requires translating this diagnosis into evidence on household-level mechanisms and welfare trajectories and drawing out clear implications for intervention design.

Coping responses under shocks

The literature distinguishes between two main types of shocks: idiosyncratic and covariate (Günther and Harttgen, 2009). Idiosyncratic shocks, such as illness or job loss, are specific to individual households, whereas covariate shocks, such as droughts, floods, or conflict, affect entire communities. Depending on their frequency, duration, and intensity (IPCC, 2023; ACLED, 2024), they can have significant impacts on households (Bandara et al., 2015; Carter et al., 2007; Khan et al., 2015), particularly in low-income countries.

Covariate shocks, in particular, are associated with acute food insecurity (Kebede et al., 2021; Ulimwengu, 2025), as well as severe and potentially irreversible welfare losses. They often alter asset trajectories and recovery prospects over time (Dercon, 2004). This is because covariate shocks, by striking many households simultaneously, overwhelm risk-sharing networks and reduce the scope for mutual assistance (Townsend, 1994; Dercon, 2002; Lund, 2003; Shehu and Sidique, 2015). Asset destruction from floods or conflicts further fuels mass migration and the dislocation of communities including the very social networks desperately needed by poor households to survive

This is reflected in recent work highlighting that broader pooling arrangements can substantially reduce exposure to covariate risk but require scale and cooperation to remain effective (Leip et al., 2024). In practice, cooperative mechanisms may weaken or fail precisely when shocks are widespread and repeated (Krendelsberger, 2025; Ding and Elahi, 2025; Xu and Zhang, 2025). This “cooperation paradox” is especially acute in fragile multi-shock contexts, where thinner risk-sharing networks face repeated stress and institutional backstops are weak (IIED, 2023; World Bank, 2025). In the absence of effective formal insurance, households end up relying more heavily on their own resources, including unsustainable self-insurance strategies.

Households’ coping responses and the constraints that shape them are central to how shocks translate into long-term outcomes. Distress asset sales, for instance, can depress asset values precisely when liquidity and credit are most needed (Dercon, 2004), whereas risk-pooling mechanisms, such as savings groups with emergency funds, can help smooth consumption without eroding productive capacity (Panman, 2021[10]). Accordingly, humanitarian measurement frameworks organised coping into stress, crisis, and emergency tiers based on their longer-term implications for resilience (WFP, 2008; Maxwell et al., 2014). Stress strategies (e.g., borrowing food) are generally reversible and often draw on risk-sharing, while crisis (e.g., selling small livestock) and emergency strategies (e.g., selling core productive assets) are more erosive and more likely to rely on self-insurance.

Understanding how households choose between these responses, and under which constraints, is key for designing effective policies for shock management. A common framing in the literature is that households respond sequentially, escalating from low‑cost, reversible actions (stress) to high‑cost, potentially irreversible ones (crisis and emergency) as needs persist and constraints tighten. In Sahelian settings, Davies (1996) documents a stepwise progression during droughts: households first adjust consumption and rely on reciprocity, then liquidate minor assets or reallocate labour, and finally resort to distress strategies such as selling productive assets. Earlier famine scholarship similarly describes a “coping range” with thresholds that trigger movement from reversible to increasingly irreversible measures (Corbett, 1988). This logic implies implicit thresholds: coping strategies are triggered when cumulative pressure pushes households past a given point.

Yet while coping is often conceptualized as a progression from reversible to erosive strategies, evidence and measurement work in protracted and covariate-shock settings indicate substantial heterogeneity. Some households follow a stepwise sequence, whereas others may compress or skip stages, signalling structural constraints. Female-headed households, for instance, with fewer assets, weaker credit access, and thinner risk-sharing networks, are more likely to adopt cross-tier portfolios, combining stress, crisis, and emergency strategies simultaneously (Quisumbing et al., 2014; FAO, 2021). This is because they face a reduced “option value of waiting”: delaying action can rapidly translate into sharper welfare losses, food shortfalls, forced distress sales, or falls below critical asset thresholds, so households may resort to more erosive coping earlier or combine strategies across tiers.

Under repeated or overlapping shocks, Devereux (2001) further argues that, coping sequences collapse more rapidly, with increasingly more households moving directly from stress to emergency strategies without prior use of crisis strategies.

Figure 1. Visual description of the interplay between shocks, resilience, vulnerability and coping strategies in determining food outcomes

Source: Author, drawing on the literature review

From coping responses to poverty traps

This heterogeneity matters because early resort to crisis or emergency coping jeopardises asset accumulation dynamics and predicts more persistent welfare losses and poverty. Multiple dynamics are at play.

Emergency responses affect two types of assets key in asset accumulation dynamics: physical assets and human capital. On the physical side, Barrett and McPeak (2003) show how asset dynamics can be S-shaped, implying critical thresholds in asset space, so that losses below a certain point may shift households toward low-level equilibria with persistently low income. On the human-capital side, they stress that health and nutrition are themselves assets and can be subject to irreversibilities: severe illness, disability, or long-term undernutrition can permanently reduce productivity, undermining returns to other assets and lowering future income capacity. Because these human-capital losses can be difficult or impossible to “reconstitute,” emergency coping that sacrifices nutrition and health can generate long-run scarring in welfare trajectories.

Heightened vulnerability also leads to suboptimal choices in terms of asset smoothing versus consumption smoothing because households rationally respond to the risk of crossing critical thresholds. Barrett and McPeak highlight that with uninsurable asset risk, forward-looking households balance standard consumption-smoothing motives against an “asset-smoothing” motive, protecting the productive base that determines future income, even if that means allowing consumption to become more volatile. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion, poorer households may also “pay” more to reduce exposure to downside risk through low-return activity choices or conservative portfolios, implying foregone earnings and slower accumulation. In their framing, credible safety nets can relax these constraints by truncating downside risk, potentially crowding in higher-return investment and reducing excessive asset-smoothing behaviour.

Households who end up falling below a certain capital threshold following shocks do not experience only the direct effects; they can be pulled into long poverty trajectories. In the poverty-traps framework, the pivotal feature is precisely the existence of critical wealth thresholds that are difficult to cross from below: above the threshold, expected asset growth moves households toward a higher-productivity steady state, while below it, expected dynamics move households toward a low-level equilibrium characterized by frequent or persistent poverty. Because these dynamics operate through assets and their returns, and because credit and insurance constraints limit recovery, even relatively small shocks can have lasting effects for households with low initial endowments. Safety nets matter in this model not only as short-term relief but as protection against falling below the threshold where trajectories diverge.

Conclusion

Overlapping shocks are not new to fragile regions, but their recurrence and simultaneity have taken on new centrality in development debates. Classic famine studies already noted that drought, conflict, and market collapse often coincided (Corbett, 1988; Davies, 1996), yet they were largely analysed in isolation. Recent decades have shifted the analytical focus toward multi-shock environments.

Despite growing recognition, most studies still analyse coping responses one shock at a time and assume households follow a sequential path from stress to crisis to emergency. This overlooks how overlapping shocks may compress decision-making and push households into cross-tier portfolios, particularly where vulnerability is high.

Vulnerability often translates into who are less exposed to shocks, who commands the most assets, has access to institutional support and eventually enjoys the largest coping set. Vulnerability may be conditioned by social class, gender, age, education, disability, ethnicity, or migrant status (IPCC, 2023). They explain how shocks influence poverty trajectories within communities. The study and monitoring of these vulnerabilities is therefore key for the management of crises lying ahead.

-------

If Limits to Growth was right about anything, it’s that breakdown rarely arrives as a single bang. It arrives as a thinning: less margin, less slack, less room to recover. What this review shows is how that thinning happens at ground level, through coping choices that protect today by mortgaging tomorrow, pushing households below thresholds where recovery becomes unlikely. The Sahel isn’t just a case study; it’s a warning about what “overshoot” looks like in human lives.

-------

[1] https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099060225084038068/pdf/P174124-7f924085-a2c6-47d4-ada8-b6a70de90d72.pdf

[2] https://www.fightfoodcrises.net/report/global-report-food-crises-2025/

[3] https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf

[4]https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/239371468331188526/pdf/766740JRN0WBRO00Box374385B00PUBLIC0.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[5] https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099060225084038068/pdf/P174124-7f924085-a2c6-47d4-ada8-b6a70de90d72.pdf

[6] https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099060225084038068/pdf/P174124-7f924085-a2c6-47d4-ada8-b6a70de90d72.pdf

[7] https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/069ceb86-59b2-4b6e-90e0-b7bd26a58c76/content?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[8]https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Chapter08.pdf

[9] https://wrd.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/Gender-Dimensions-of-Disaster-Risk-and-Resilience-Existing-Evidence.pdf

[10]https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351213857_Saving_Up_for_a_Rainy_Day_Savings_Groups_and_Resilience_to_Flooding_in_Dar_es_Salaam_Tanzania/fulltext/6093b2af299bf1ad8d7dac21/Saving-Up-for-a-Rainy-Day-Savings-Groups-and-Resilience-to-Flooding-in-Dar-es-Salaam-Tanzania.pdf?origin=publication_detail&_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InB1YmxpY2F0aW9uIiwicGFnZSI6InB1YmxpY2F0aW9uRG93bmxvYWQiLCJwcmV2aW91c1BhZ2UiOiJwdWJsaWNhdGlvbiJ9fQ&__cf_chl_tk=o37akbvT8TCzMDS0zCALVLyy02hH4oH7xFmUvVlqRus-1768583377-1.0.1.1-0zfoF2IRBq_.kBLjx5Sgg5_SvW6yo4mIQlOmcjoK8h4